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Abstract
Migrants are able to provide firms with knowledge about their country of
origin. This can become a valuable source of knowledge for firms in the process
of internationalization. Relating to a Knowledge-Based-View perspective, this
paper explains how the resource commitment of firms to foreign countries is
contingent on immigration from those countries: Immigrants’ country
knowledge reduces uncertainty and makes the governance of foreign
operations more efficient. Moreover, this paper connects the relevance of
knowledge for firm internationalization to institutional characteristics in
immigrants’ home and host countries, both of which policymakers can
shape. We test predictions on more than 13,000 observations over a 14-year
period (2003–2016). The paper identifies economically significant
contingencies of a positive effect of immigration, which are robust to
changes in model specification, measurement, and sampling. The results
indicate how immigration can shape firms’ investments abroad and have
implications for developing policy as well as international business theory.
Journal of International Business Policy (2019).
https://doi.org/10.1057/s42214-019-00034-9
Keywords: migration; resource commitment; knowledge-based view; institutional
environment; hierarchical linear modeling
The online version of this article is available Open Access
INTRODUCTION
International migration has grown rapidly in recent decades, from
173 million migrants in 2000 to 258 million in 2017, which
accounts for about 3.4 percent of the world population (United
Nations, 2017). Consequently, the costs and challenges of migra-
tion, and immigrants’ integration, became a recurring topic for
policymakers around the world (e.g., Alba & Foner; 2016; Fong &
Ooka, 2002; Nyberg-Sørensen, Hear, & Engberg–Pedersen, 2002).
Research demonstrates the economic consequences of interna-
tional migration for trade (Gould, 1994; Head & Ries, 1998), foreign
direct investments (Javorcik, O¨zden, Spatareanu, & Neagu, 2011;
Kugler & Rapoport, 2007), and international strategic considera-
tions that lead to stronger resource commitments to migrants’
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home countries (Chung & Enderwick, 2001; Chung
& Tung, 2013; Zaheer, Lamin, & Subramani, 2009;
Zhao & Hsu, 2007). Those effects stem from, at least
partially, a knowledge advantage that immigrants
create for firms in the countries that receive them: a
firm located where migrants move can use the
migrants’ knowledge to reduce knowledge barriers
to the markets from which migrants originate. This
in turn reduces a firm’s uncertainty associated with
migrants’ home countries, which results in these
countries being more attractive to a firm seeking
foreign operations.
However, research to date largely assumes that
this knowledge advantage is mostly a consequence
of effects at the level of individual pairs of home and
host countries and therefore is universally available
across firms and different contexts for these country
pairs. To some extent, this simplification may result
from study samples with limited variation in the
home- or host-country environment, as these set-
tings do not allow tests that differentiate among
these various contexts. Consequently, there are still
substantial unknowns in the relationship between
migration and a firm’s investment decisions. In
particular, it is unclear how migrants’ knowledge
can create a knowledge advantage that benefits a
firm’s decisions on resource commitment. Knowl-
edge-based perspectives, however, highlight that, to
create value at the firm level, the knowledge must be
relevant and the firm must absorb it (Alcacer &
Chung, 2007; Hernandez, 2014; Wiklund & Shep-
herd, 2003). What is more, theoretical approaches
and empirical contributions note that the degree to
which knowledge is valuable and applicable to a
firm depends on the institutional conditions in
which the firm is doing business (Beukel & Zhao,
2018; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2018).
We build on this research, drawing on the
Knowledge-Based View (KBV) (Almeida & Kogut,
1999; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Wiklund & Shep-
herd, 2003), and argue that country-level migra-
tion creates knowledge pools that contain
information about a specific country (immigrants’
home country) in another country (immigrants’
host country). A firm can benefit from this
knowledge pool when it internationalizes from
its home country (immigrants’ host country) to
another country (immigrants’ home country), due
to migrants’ spillover of knowledge that results
from their interaction with the local population
(Gould, 1994; Oettl & Agrawal, 2008). However,
we argue that policy instability in migrants’ home
countries and high anti-immigrant sentiment in
the area to which migrants move influence the
knowledge benefits that a firm can reap from
immigration. The knowledge that migrants
import from their home countries: (1) becomes
less valuable if circumstances in their home
countries change, and (2) is harder to absorb into
a firm’s knowledge base if anti-immigrant senti-
ment makes the interaction with immigrants
more difficult. As a consequence, a firm will
derive reduced benefits from immigration, and its
transactions with immigrants’ home countries
will not reach their full potential.
An investigation of how firms react to different
flows of immigration requires an empirical ‘‘labo-
ratory’’ that isolates the effects of immigration from
those of related constructs. This paper uses a
unique panel dataset of more than 13,000 parent
firm–host country–year observations of approxi-
mately 600 Austrian firms around the world, across
all industries and sizes. Austria is an effective
context for this study, and for examining how
immigration relates to firm internationalization in
general, because it receives a large number of
immigrants relative to its population from many
different countries, has large within-country varia-
tion in immigration patterns (Statistik Austria,
2018a), and a highly international economy (Statis-
tik Austria, 2018b).
Given the growing societal relevance of migra-
tion and the economic relevance of foreign invest-
ments and trade for economies and firms, this
paper has substantial implications for policymak-
ers. First, it may help policymakers not only to
understand the implications of immigration for
firms engaged in international activity, which
positively contributes to their home-country
employment and standards of living, but also to
develop policy accordingly. Second, this paper
provides evidence on the contingencies of the
relationship between immigration and firm activity
abroad. The results provide evidence as to what
extent anti-immigrant sentiments influence the
economic benefits associated with immigration
and under what conditions immigrants’ knowledge
creates value for firm internationalization. Third, it
makes an important contribution to international
business theory by integrating the KBV with exist-
ing institutional perspectives on uncertainty and
risk in the context of firm internationalization.
Finally, this paper has direct implications for firms,
as the results outline ways to benefit from the flow
of immigration in the process of
internationalization.
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MIGRATION AND FIRM
INTERNATIONALIZATION: A KNOWLEDGE
PERSPECTIVE
Empirical investigations have analyzed the rela-
tionship between migration and the international-
ization activities of firms into the immigrants’
country of origin. Past country-level studies find a
positive relationship between immigration and
outward foreign direct investment (FDI) (Javorcik
et al., 2011; Kugler & Rapoport, 2007) as well as
increased trade activities between migrants’ home
and host countries (Gould, 1994; Head & Ries,
1998) as a consequence of immigration. At the
firm-level, international business literature shows a
positive link between immigration and FDI loca-
tion choice, as well as the choice of entry modes,
with higher commitments of resources made to
migrants’ home countries (Chung & Enderwick,
2001; Chung & Tung, 2013; Hernandez, 2014;
Zaheer et al., 2009; Zhao & Hsu, 2007). These
studies make an implicit theoretical link between
business activity abroad and international migra-
tion through reasoning that follows the KBV:
immigration leads to knowledge transfer from the
migrants’ home countries to their new countries of
residence.
Knowledge about circumstances in target coun-
tries is a core variable in international investment
decisions (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Firm inter-
nationalization is characterized by high degrees of
uncertainty about the foreign location, which can
arise from limited knowledge about certain vari-
ables (Krishna Erramilli & D0 Souza, 1995). A lack of
knowledge concerning the social, cultural, or polit-
ical environment leads to higher uncertainty for
foreign firms about the host country compared to
local companies. Through the accumulation of
host-country knowledge, this uncertainty can be
reduced which leads to higher commitments into
the respective host country (Hernandez, 2014;
Johanson & Vahlne, 1977).
Interactions between immigrants and other co-
located individuals in the immigrants’ country of
residence lead to knowledge flows between differ-
ent market actors, contributing to the transfer of
knowledge that goes beyond the employment of
immigrants (Hernandez, 2014; Oettl & Agrawal,
2008). Immigrants therefore can contribute to the
development of a regional knowledge pool, which
can become the source for knowledge spillovers to
companies (Gould, 1994). The factor of immi-
grants’ knowledge, also called the ‘‘immigrant
information effect’’ (Gould, 1994) or ‘‘the informa-
tion effect’’ (Wagner, Head, & Ries, 2002), can
provide firms with host-country knowledge that is
valuable, rare, unique, and difficult to imitate
(Chung, Rose, & Huang, 2012).
Immigrants’ knowledge can develop in two ways:
(1) from personal experiences in their home coun-
try before emigration, and (2) after emigration due
to established and ongoing relationships with their
home country. The former refers to the direct
experience that immigrants gain working or living
in their country of origin (Chung, Enderwick, &
Naruemitmongkonsuk, 2010). The latter refers to
networks and contacts abroad, where immigrants
may collect new relevant knowledge through active
political, business, or social networks in their
country of origin (Javorcik et al., 2011; Rauch,
2001). Furthermore, the access to social networks
goes beyond merely the inflow of knowledge; these
networks also facilitate the verification of informa-
tion about a firm’s target country and provide,
through ongoing contact and exchange, the foun-
dation for up-to-date market knowledge (Zhao &
Hsu, 2007).
As a consequence of both the knowledge they
possess from living in a certain environment and
their ability to effectively obtain new knowledge
about that environment from afar, immigrants
have a positive effect on overcoming knowledge
barriers between their home and host countries
(Hernandez, 2014; Kugler & Rapoport, 2007), as
long as firms can absorb their knowledge. Migrants
can develop a comprehensive understanding of the
language, the economic, cultural, and political
systems, and the business practices of their home
countries (Chung et al., 2012). The ‘‘information
effect’’ (Wagner et al., 2002) can shorten a firm’s
learning process about a foreign host country and
reduce the perceived psychic distance to the firm’s
host country (Zhao & Hsu, 2007). Immigrants’
knowledge about regulations, the language, cus-
toms (Chung et al., 2012), or market needs and
opportunities (Aubry, Kugler, & Rapoport, 2012;
Wagner et al., 2002) reduces knowledge discrepan-
cies for a firm located in the immigrants’ host
country that considers investing in the immigrants’
home countries. Firms’ familiarity with host mar-
kets improves because of immigrants’ first-hand
market knowledge and social ties to their respective
home countries (Chung & Enderwick, 2001; Zhao
& Hsu, 2007). Firms can therefore benefit from the
knowledge that immigrants offer and engage in
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information arbitrage to enhance their corporate
internationalization strategies, especially in the
immigrants’ home country.
HYPOTHESES
A firm’s knowledge of a host country is an essential
resource if the firm seeks to make commitments to
that country (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Kogut &
Zander, 1993). Therefore, according to KBV logic
(Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Kogut & Zander, 1992;
Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003), knowledge can be a
source of competitive advantage for internationally
active firms. In line with literature, we argue that
there is a knowledge spillover effect from immi-
grants to companies, which increases the firms’
understanding of the conditions in a target country
(Gould, 1994; Head & Ries, 1998; Javorcik et al.,
2011). We theorize that immigrants’ knowledge
can be transferred in two different ways: directly
through being employed by the firm (knowledge
through employment) or indirectly through the
immigrants’ social networks (knowledge through
network effects).
First, firms can benefit from immigrants’ knowl-
edge directly: immigrants can be the owner of the
firm, be part of the top management team, or
otherwise employed in the company. If so, the
immigrant can either directly apply their knowl-
edge or transfer the knowledge to a colleague who
is in charge of the international activities of the
firm. In both cases, the firm can use the immi-
grant’s knowledge and can benefit from it.
Second, immigrants can also contribute to a
firm’s knowledge indirectly. They may contribute
knowledge about their home countries to a local
knowledge pool located outside, but in close prox-
imity to the firms. Firms can receive knowledge
spillovers from those knowledge pools. Close spa-
tial proximity makes knowledge flows easier (Agra-
wal, Cockburn, & McHale, 2006). First-tier and
second-tier social relationships drive this mecha-
nism. Immigrants can have relationships with
people working in the parent firm (first-order tie),
or firm employees can know someone who knows
an immigrant (second-order tie). Oettl and Agrawal
(2008) show that social relationships explain
knowledge transfers. The basis for these knowledge
transfers is that people who migrate from one
country to another will establish relationships with
people in the local community in their new home
country (Oettl & Agrawal, 2008). Such relationships
can be established in every-day life through friend-
ship between immigrants and non-immigrants,
contact in school or at the gym, coincidental
meetings at a coffee shop or supermarket (Agrawal
et al., 2006), or through professional contact at
events like conferences (Singh, 2005). In other
words, people who work for the parent firm can
have knowledge about immigrants’ home countries
due to their relationships with immigrants outside
of the firm (first-order tie).
Singh (2005) and Chung, Yen and Wang (2019)
show that interpersonal networks are facilitators for
knowledge diffusion beyond firm boundaries.
Those networks not only consist of first-tier rela-
tionships but also include second (and higher)-
order links. Thus, knowledge about the immigrants’
home country can also be received from other
persons someone knows who are in close contact
with immigrants. This means that immigrants can
transfer their knowledge to persons who work in a
company, or an employee knows someone who
again knows an immigrant from a potential host
country and can transfer the knowledge via such an
indirect relationship. The knowledge about an
immigrant’s home country can therefore be spread
to many people in the immigrant’s surrounding.
Hence, we regard an immigrant not only from a
human capital perspective (someone who works in
a company and applies her skills and knowledge)
but also from a social perspective as someone who
interacts with the local community. Because first-
and second-tier indirect ties increase geometrically
with the number of immigrants, small numbers of
immigrants can transfer knowledge widely. If, for
example, 100 immigrants have 5 independent first-
order ties to the local population, and every
member of the local population has 10 indepen-
dent first-order ties to other members of the
population, 100 immigrants will have 5,000 sec-
ond-order ties to members of the local community.
Firms can use the knowledge they obtain from
immigrants, either directly or indirectly, to better
control their operations abroad. First, it enables
firms to more accurately identify relevant sources of
risk and to develop mitigation strategies (Johanson
& Vahlne, 1977). Immigration can hence reduce
uncertainty and help firms to overcome knowledge
barriers between their home and (potential) host
countries, which is an advantage over alternative
investment locations (Hernandez, 2014). Second,
when internationalizing, firms must consider the
costs of doing business in a target location
Benefitting from immigration Vera Kunczer et al.
Journal of International Business Policy
(Dunning, 1998). As firms have access to more
knowledge about a target country (and therefore a
reduced degree of uncertainty), the costs of collect-
ing and interpreting information decrease for firms
that want to operate in the immigrants’ home
country. In general, more host-country knowledge
therefore decreases the uncertainty for firms in the
immigrants’ home country, which leads to lower
costs. This incentivizes firms to invest, and to
increase existing investments, because it allows
them to more efficiently control resources they
commit to a country (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2018).
In summary, we argue that the knowledge pools
that immigrants provide reduce the costs associated
with collecting and interpreting information about
a foreign country. Consequently, firms’ foreign
operations in immigrants’ home countries become
more efficient and parent firms commit more
resources. Accordingly, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1: Resource commitments from the
parent firm to a foreign subsidiary increase with
immigration from the subsidiary country to the
location of the parent firm.
Based on KBV reasoning, in order for knowledge
to create advantages, the knowledge must be valu-
able to the firm (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Rodrik,
2018). Knowledge that allows a firm to understand
the policy environment is an essential type of host-
country knowledge (Delios & Henisz, 2003; Henisz,
2000). Migrants can develop policy knowledge with
regards to their home countries through experien-
tial learning in their home country or via social
networks (Chung et al., 2012). Such knowledge,
established by immigration, can therefore provide a
valuable resource for firm internationalization, as
long as the policy environment in migrants’ home
countries is relatively stable.
We argue that instability in the policy environ-
ment in migrants’ home countries reduces the
value of migrant knowledge for two reasons. First,
migrants’ experiential knowledge about policy
structures, processes, and decision-makers becomes
less applicable. In countries characterized by high
instability, policy change can be rapid and non-
linear (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000), making country
knowledge about policy structures that was gained
experientially less applicable (Nadkarni & Chen,
2014). Second, policy instability reduces the value
of knowledge migrants develop through social
networks, as policy instability reduces the ability
to recognize opportunities (Garrett & Holland,
2015) and to correctly interpret situations in such
environments (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000), partic-
ularly from afar. This can reduce the knowledge
migrants derive from the network, and lessen its
efficient interpretation. Accordingly, we argue that
the value firms can derive from knowledge pools is
less valuable if the policy environment in the
immigrants’ home countries is unstable, leading
to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The positive relationship
between immigration and resource commitment
to a foreign subsidiary (Hypothesis 1) is nega-
tively moderated by higher policy instability in
the subsidiary country.
The KBV suggests that, for knowledge to be
beneficial, firms must successfully absorb it (Alcacer
& Chung, 2007; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Wiklund &
Shepherd, 2003). The knowledge a firm receives
through the presence of immigrants is a conse-
quence of that firm’s ability to access knowledge
pools that immigration creates. Knowledge sharing
can be difficult if immigrants and the local popu-
lation are not willing or able to interact with one
another. According to Amir (1969) and Li & Tong
(2018), the environmental context is an important
factor for the development of contact with and
relationships between groups. The climate for the
interaction between immigrants and the local
population is therefore an important determinant
of the knowledge exchange between immigrants
and the local population. If immigrants are con-
fronted with anti-immigrant sentiment from the
local population, it is likely that they will share less
knowledge (Johnson & Jacobson, 2005).
One key antecedent of how interactions work
between groups in general, and immigrant and
local populations in particular, is the institutional
support for contact (Li & Tong, 2018) that com-
prises the support from the executive and legisla-
tive authorities (Pettigrew, 1998). Furthermore,
contact between groups is enhanced by indirect
institutional support that can stem from the ‘‘social
atmosphere’’ or a ‘‘general public agreement’’
(Amir, 1969) that foster interaction between immi-
grants and the local population. In this sense, the
political attitude of the local population is central
to the institutional support for contact between
local population and immigrants.
We argue that the extent of knowledge sharing
between immigrants and the local population is
subject to institutional factors. Regions with high
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anti-immigrant sentiment have reduced knowledge
exchange: they will be less accepting of immi-
grants, who will in turn interact less with the local
population, and firms therefore have less access to
the knowledge of those immigrants. Hence, in line
with KBV, we argue that a negative attitude towards
immigration hampers the absorption of knowledge
in firms located in such areas, which leads to the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The positive relationship between
immigration and resource commitment to a for-
eign subsidiary (Hypothesis 1) is negatively mod-
erated by higher anti-immigrant sentiment in the
location of the parent firm (Figure 1).
EMPIRICAL SETTING AND DATA
We conduct our study in the context of Austrian
firms. Austria provides an effective ‘‘laboratory’’ for
this study because it is a developed country that
receives a high number of immigrants relative to its
population. In the year 2016, 23 percent of Aus-
tria’s total population were born in a foreign
country (1,594,723 of 8,700,471 people), and
between 2003 and 2016, international net immi-
gration to Austria reached 626,920 (Statistik Aus-
tria, 2018a). Austria has borders with eight different
countries, made up of German-speaking countries
(Germany, Liechtenstein, Switzerland), Eastern
European countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Hungary), and Italy. This geographic
closeness encourages immigration from these
countries that are characterized by different envi-
ronments. What is more, immigration patterns
have changed over time. Austria historically expe-
rienced high immigration flows from Germany and
Eastern European countries. In the last few years,
however, immigration from Asian countries has
picked up substantially (Statistik Austria, 2018a).
Austria also has large within-country variation in
immigration patterns. While the western regions
mostly receive immigrants from Germany and
Italy, the eastern parts of the country have sub-
stantial immigrant populations from Eastern Eur-
ope and Turkey. In addition, Austria’s economy is
highly international, with approximately 50 per-
cent of its GDP generated by business activity
abroad (Statistik Austria, 2018b). The most attrac-
tive countries for FDI by Austrian firms in our
sample are Germany, Hungary, the Czech Republic,
Switzerland, and Poland. Immigration data are
available from Statistic Austria StatCube on a
political district-year level, starting in 2002, and
includes all foreign-born inhabitants who register
Austria as their principal residence for at least
90 days per year.1
Austria is divided into approximately 200 polit-
ical districts, with an average population of approx-
imately 40,000 inhabitants. Within Austria, we
investigate how the immigration flow to a political
district affects firms located there. This is because
knowledge sharing is possible mainly when immi-
grants and companies are based in the same
location. Therefore, the political districts provide
a smaller, more suitable entity than individual
counties.
The subsidiary data we use come from the ADI
(Aktive Direktinvestitionen—Active Direct Invest-
ments) dataset provided by the Austrian Central
Bank (Oesterreichische National Bank, OeNB). The
Austrian Central Bank collects this annual data
from all Austrian firms with a voting capital share
of minimum EUR 500,000. This provides the most
comprehensive data about Austrian firms’ interna-
tional operations, including about Austrian head-
quarters, foreign subsidiaries, and the relationship
between the two. The dataset offers general infor-
mation about the Austrian companies including
their Ultimate Beneficial Owners (UBO), number of
employees, and financial information on parent
H1 (+)
H3 (-)H2 (-)
Immigration from 
host country to 
parent firm location
Resource commitment 
to host country
Anti-immigrant 
sentiment in the 
home district
Policy instability in 
the host country
Figure 1 Research
framework.
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companies and subsidiaries. Because it is collected
by Austria’s central bank, the dataset is a compre-
hensive representation of the complete activities
abroad of the included firms.
We limit the sample to companies located in an
environment in which the knowledge that immi-
grants can provide constitutes added value for the
firms. To be part of our sample, firms must be
located in an environment with no comparable
alternative knowledge sources that could efficiently
provide host-country knowledge. In this sense, we
excluded from our analysis firms located in ‘‘global
cities’’ (Goerzen, Asmussen, & Nielsen, 2013). We
characterize global cities as having three qualities:
international connectedness, advanced producer
services, and a cosmopolitan environment (Go-
erzen et al., 2013). This means that companies in
global cities are surrounded by high international-
ity, a high degree of knowledge spillovers from
international firms, a culturally diverse population,
specific managerial capabilities that firms require
for internationalization, and ongoing inflows of
knowledge resources. Austria’s country’s capital
and largest city, Vienna, represents such a global
city. Consequently, we include only companies
that are not located in the districts that make up
Vienna or its directly adjacent districts.
Additionally, this study considers only compa-
nies with Austrian UBOs and only direct sub-
sidiaries of the Austrian companies, because we
want to exclude potential confounding effects that
a foreign UBO may have on an Austrian subsidiary
which, in turn, controls subsidiaries abroad. For
example, a foreign UBO can transfer and provide
knowledge about the firm’s host countries, which
can benefit the Austrian company in its interna-
tionalization process. We also exclude indirect
subsidiaries of Austrian companies to eliminate
confounding effects, because an intermediary sub-
sidiary may also provide knowledge advantages
that this study cannot observe. To eliminate bias
from several subsidiaries that firms have in the
same country abroad, we aggregate into one entity
all information on subsidiary firms in the same
foreign country and year. Finally, due to their
specific organizational structures, regulations, and
internationalization behaviors, we exclude from
this study firms that operate in regulated, public,
financial, or educational industries. As a result, we
test the above hypotheses on a sample of 13,788
parent firm–host country–year observations in 73
different host countries over a 14-year (2003–2016)
period. We use panel data, i.e., cross-sectional data
over several years. This allows us to consider
variation over time in immigration flows and firms’
resource commitments. At the same time, it allows
us to consider cross-sectional variation across polit-
ical districts and firms.
MEASUREMENTS
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this analysis is a contin-
uous variable indicating the total assets a firm’s
subsidiaries in each foreign country own in a
specific year. We measure these subsidiary assets
using the ADI dataset maintained by the OeNB, and
standardize this variable.
Independent Variable
The main independent variable is the number of
immigrants from a subsidiary’s host country com-
ing to the political district in which the parent firm
is located, in a certain year. This measurement is in
line with prior studies that also use immigration to
account for the knowledge effects of immigration
(Gould, 1994; Hernandez, 2014; Wagner et al.,
2002). We measure migration inflow on the level of
the political district (3-digit district code) in Austria
(except for towns with a city statute, which we treat
as single entities). To measure immigration, we use
the Statistic Austria StatCube data on cross-border
migration. We measure these data at the dis-
trict level to account for the knowledge spillovers
of immigrants to companies located in the same
district. To avoid reverse causality, we standardize
the immigration variable and lag it by 1 year.
Moderating Variables
For the moderator variable in Hypothesis 2, we
measure policy instability in immigrants’ home
countries using the POLCON dataset (Henisz,
2000). The Political Constraint Index indicates the
degree to which veto rights in the political system
constrain policy changes. The higher a country is in
the ranking, the higher the constraints, which
means that policy changes are not easily realizable.
This leads to higher stability and reduced uncer-
tainty in the policy environment. To facilitate
interpretation of the regression coefficient for the
moderation, and in line with prior literature (e.g.,
Holburn & Zelner, 2010), we invert the POLCON
variable. Thus, in our analysis, a higher value
indicates higher risk of policy changes and
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therefore of policy instability. The variable ranges
from 0 (low policy instability) to 1 (high policy
instability).
We measure anti-immigrant sentiment using
political support for anti-immigrant parties (the
moderator variable in Hypothesis 3) using election
data for federal elections for the years 2003–2016.
Federal elections took place in 2002, 2006, 2008,
2013, and 2017. For the years inbetween, we linearly
interpolate the election results. More specifically,
we measure the yearly growth (in percent) in the
share of votes for Austrian anti-immigrant parties
(BZO¨ and FPO¨).2 A change in election results
represents the voters’ preferences for these parties:
a positive number indicates growing support for
right-wing parties, whereas a negative number
stands for the opposite (Tavits, 2007). An increase
in votes for these parties associates with rising anti-
immigrant sentiment. This variable is measured on
the political-district level, and the data are available
from the Austrian electoral database (Oesterreichis-
che Wahldatenbank). We standardize both moder-
ator variables and lag them by 1 year.
Control variables
We use several control variables on the parent-,
subsidiary-, and host-country levels. We include
the number of parent-firm employees to indicate
the firm size and its capital endowments. We
expect that larger parent firms will invest more in
their subsidiaries. We also control for the experi-
ence that the parent firms have in the host
countries by including the number of years the
parent company has operated in the host country.
More experience in the subsidiaries’ country
reduces the need of the parent firm for host-
country knowledge as the company can directly
collect information through operating there, and
consequently the uncertainty for the parent firm in
this country diminishes over time (Rangan &
Sengul, 2009). We expect that this leads to larger
commitments of resources (Pedersen & Petersen,
1998). The ownership share the parent company
holds in its subsidiaries in a target country, as well
as the question of whether the subsidiary is a
greenfield or brownfield investment, influence the
firm’s willingness to allocate more resources to its
subsidiaries (Luo, 2004). We weight both variables
according to the subsidiary’s assets and aggregate
the variables over the parents’ host country to bring
it to the same level of analysis as the dependent
variable. We include the target country’s GDP per
capita to control for the development of the target
country’s economy. To capture the overall FDI
attractiveness of the country, we control for GDP
growth in the target country and FDI inflows into
the target country (Garcı´a-Canal & Guille´n, 2008).
Those variables account for macro-economic devel-
opments (e.g., economic crises) that can influence
the profitability of foreign ventures in a country
and reduce a company’s willingness to make com-
mitments into the respective countries. We mea-
sure the distance between a parent’s home country
and a potential target country using geographic
distance (Berry, Guille´n, & Nan, 2010).3 We draw
firm-level control data from the ADI database and
country-level control data from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators. We lag all of the
continuous control variables by 1 year and stan-
dardized them for regression analyses. Table 1
provides an overview of the variables used in the
analysis.
METHODOLOGY
We investigate the asset levels of foreign sub-
sidiaries per parent firm, year, and host country
using hierarchical linear regressions (Hox, Moer-
beek, & Van de Schoot, 2017). The estimation
technique for the resource allocation to a foreign
subsidiary is a linear mixed effects model using the
lmer() command (Croissant & Millo, 2018) in R. We
executed the modeling strategy in an R 3.4.3.
distribution (R-Core-Team, 2017). Linear mixed
effects models allow us to use random intercepts
and hence to consider hierarchical structures in our
data. We use the political district as the random
intercept in our model, given that we analyze
immigration flows not to the whole country but to
Austrian districts, and that the Austrian companies
are clustered within these different districts. For-
mally, we estimate the amount of assets that firm i
based in political district j commits to its sub-
sidiaries in country l at time t, depending on the
immigration from country l into the political
district j at time t - 1 with the random intercept
on the political-district level j:
Assetsijlt ¼ b0 þ b1  controlsijlt1 þ b2
 immigrationjlt1 þ uj þ eijlt
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To understand the contingency of the relation-
ship between immigration and resource commit-
ment, we decompose the coefficient b2 depending
on the policy instability in the immigrants’ home
country l at time t - 1, and the anti-immigrant
sentiment in political district j at time t - 1:
b2 ¼ c0 þ c1  policy instabilitylt1 þ c2
 anti-immigrant sentimentjt1
Table 1 Variables used in the estimations
Variable Description Level Source
Host country assets
(DV)
Sum of all subsidiary assets in a host country (in EUR) Parent firm–host
country–year
ADI
Migrant inflows (IV) Migration inflow from subsidiary country into the parent firms’
political district
Host country–parent
firm political district–
year
Statistik Austria
Policy instability
(Moderator)
POLCON (III) index (inverted) for the subsidiary country Host country–year Henisz (2000)
Anti-immigrant
sentiment
(Moderator)
Yearly growth in the share of votes for Austrian anti-immigrant
parties
Parent firm political
district–year
Austrian
election
database
Greenfield
investment
Dummy indicating whether a subsidiary is a greenfield investment
(1) or not (0) weighted by the subsidiaries’ total assets in the
subsidiary country if there is more than one subsidiary in a country
Host country–year ADI
Ownership share Parent firm’s ownership share in subsidiary weighted by
subsidiaries’ total assets aggregated over the subsidiary country
Parent firm–host
country–year
ADI
Parent firm
experience
Number of years the parent firm has been active in the subsidiary
country
Parent firm–host
country–year
ADI
Parent firm
employees
Employees employed by the parent firm Parent firm–year ADI
Host country GDP
growth
Nominal GDP growth in the subsidiary country Host country–year World Bank
Host country GDP
per capita
Nominal GDP per capita in the subsidiary country (in USD) Host country–year World Bank
Host country
population
Number of inhabitants of subsidiary country Host country–year World Bank
Host country FDI
inflows
Net FDI inflows into subsidiary country (in current USD) Host country–year World Bank
Geographic
distance
Geographic distance between Austria and the subsidiary country Host country Berry, Guille´n,
& Nan (2010)
Table 2 Summary statistics
Variable n Mean SD Min Max
Host country assets (billion) 13,788 0.079 0.340 0.00000 11.779
Greenfield investment 13,788 0.507 0.500 0 1
Ownership share 13,788 0.907 0.189 0 1
Parent firm experience 13,788 13.962 14.885 0 171
Parent firm employees 13,788 596.489 3,252.564 0 73,008
Host country GDP growth 13,788 2.184 3.430 - 14.814 25.557
Host country GDP per capita 13,788 29,717.560 19,481.460 850.293 111,968.300
Host country FDI inflows (billion) 13,788 47.660 77.934 - 29.679 734.010
Host country population (million) 13,788 106.721 269.858 0.399 1,371.220
Geographic distance 13,788 2,053.152 3,061.873 176.520 18,347.970
Anti-immigrant sentiment 13,788 0.060 0.143 - 0.132 0.829
Policy instability 13,788 0.570 0.140 0.282 1.000
Migrant inflows 13,788 96.908 196.192 0 5,748
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RESULTS
Table 2 shows the summary statistics for the
unstandardized data in our analysis. The foreign
subsidiaries in our analysis have (on average) assets
of about 79 million EUR, and half of them are
greenfield investments. The average ownership
share parent companies hold is about 91%, indi-
cating that the parent firms in our sample have a
high degree of control in their subsidiaries. For the
parent firms’ experience as well as employees, the
sample shows a great variety: on average the parent
companies have been active in the host country for
14 years, but there is a substantial range (from 0 to
171 years). The average firm in the sample has 596
employees. The host countries in our data have a
yearly average growth rate in GDP of 2.2 percent, a
GDP per capita of 29,717 USD, 47.6 billion USD of
FDI inflows per year, and a population of 106
million people. The economic development as well
as the size vary greatly across the host countries,
also including the geographic distance from Aus-
tria. The sample shows a medium policy instability
(0.570) concerning the host countries, with mea-
sures from 0.282 (very low policy instability, 0
being the lowest score) and 1.000 (the highest
possible policy instability). We also consider two
variables on the political-district level, i.e., migra-
tion inflows and the growth in right-wing party
support. On average, 100 people migrated to the
political district where a parent firm is located from
the subsidiary country. The yearly growth in right-
wing support has a mean of 6.0 percent, with values
ranging from negative numbers to an increase of 83
percent from 1 year to the next. Table 3 shows
partial correlations among the variables in this
study.
Table 4 reports the results of the empirical mod-
els we use to test the hypotheses developed above.
We use hierarchal linear models to account for
random effects at the political-district level. All
models in this table include these random inter-
cepts. Model 1 is the control model, which includes
only the control variables. All coefficients except
GDP growth and host-country population have a
significant effect on firms’ resource commitment. If
subsidiaries are greenfield investments, if parent
firms have high ownership share, and if invest-
ments are distant, we observe a negative influence
on firms’ resource commitments to subsidiaries.
The size of the parent firm, its experience and the
economic development including GDP per capita
and FDI inflows positively affect the parent firms’
commitment. Ta
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In Model 2, the migration inflow variable is
added, with a positive and significant coefficient at
the 0.001-level. This provides support for Hypoth-
esis 1, which states that immigrants in a firm’s
environment positively affect the resource com-
mitment into the immigrants’ home countries. In
Model 3, we add policy instability in the host
country of a firm’s investment and its moderation
on the migration effect. We find a highly signifi-
cant negative interaction, which provides support
for Hypothesis 2. We include anti-immigrant sen-
timent as well as the interaction between this
variable and immigration flows in Model 4. As
hypothesized, higher anti-immigrant sentiment
lowers the positive relationship between
immigration and parent firms’ decisions about
making commitments there.
In Model 5, we present the full model with all
variables. All the effects are robust to the step-wise
approach we take to testing. We focus the quanti-
tative interpretation of the models on the full
model (Model 5). Again, the migration inflow
coefficient is highly significant at the 0.001-level
and shows an effect of 0.204. This means that, in
the case of an increase in migrant inflows of one
standard deviation (and when the value for policy
instability and anti-immigrant sentiment are 0,
which is in our case their respective mean because
variables are standardized in the regression analy-
sis), firms’ resource commitment in the migrants’
home country increases by 0.204 standard
Table 4 Results of regression analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant - 0.086*** 0.063** 0.009 0.056** 0.010
(0.013) (0.020) (0.023) (0.021) (0.024)
Ownership share - 0.093*** - 0.092*** - 0.092*** - 0.097*** - 0.097***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Greenfield investment - 0.040*** - 0.037*** - 0.035*** - 0.034*** - 0.032***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Parent firm experience 0.041*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.030***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Parent firm employees 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Host country GDP growth - 0.002 0.0004 0.0002 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Host country GDP per capita 0.014** 0.011* 0.007 0.012** 0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Host country FDI inflows 0.015*** 0.013** 0.012** 0.013* 0.012**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Host country population 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Geographic distance - 0.017*** - 0.010* - 0.008 - 0.011* - 0.009
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Migrant inflows 0.306*** 0.205*** 0.291*** 0.204***
(0.032) (0.038) (0.033) (0.040)
Policy instability - 0.161*** - 0.143***
(0.031) (0.033)
Migrant inflows 9 Policy instability - 0.285*** - 0.248***
(0.061) (0.064)
Anti-immigrant sentiment - 0.050*** - 0.039**
(0.014) (0.014)
Migrant inflows 9 Anti-immigrant sentiment - 0.091** - 0.069
(0.028) (0.028)
Observations 14,507 14,507 14,507 13,788 13,788
Random intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood - 8,676.730 - 8,634.633 - 8,623.293 - 8,469.799 - 8,461.665
Akaike Inf. Crit. 17,377.460 17,295.270 17,276.590 16,969.600 16,957.330
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 17,468.450 17,393.840 17,390.320 17,082.570 17,085.370
*, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels for two-sided tests, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
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deviations. The positive effect of migration inflows
on firms’ resource commitment to the migrants’
home country is negatively influenced by policy
instability in the migrants’ home country and anti-
immigrant sentiments in the firms’ home country.
Figures 2 and 3 show how the positive effect of
immigration on resource commitments in firms’
target countries is contingent on policy instability
in the target country, and the anti-immigrant
sentiment the local population has at the firm’s
location. The left panel of Figure 2 shows a strong
positive effect of immigration on firms’ resource
commitments if policy instability in the subsidiary
country is low (two standard deviations below the
mean). The right panel of Figure 2 shows that this
positive effect is eliminated if policy instability in
the subsidiary country is high (two standard devi-
ations above the mean). The left panel of Figure 3
shows a significantly positive effect of immigration
inflows on resource commitment if the anti-immi-
grant sentiment of the local population is low (two
standard deviations below the mean). The right
panel of Figure 3 again shows that this positive
effect decreases if the anti-immigrant sentiment is
high (two standard deviations above the mean).
The economic effect of the mechanisms sug-
gested here is quite substantial. An increase in one
standard deviation in immigration flows increases
the asset allocation to a foreign country by almost
60 million EUR. If we compare two firms from
districts that face extremely different immigration
flows, this variable explains substantial differences
in economic commitment. As both moderating
variables eliminate the main effect for scenarios in
which policy uncertainty and anti-immigrant sen-
timent are high, the economic effects of the
moderators are also quite substantial. Because pol-
icymakers can manage these effects, we believe that
the economic consequences of appropriate policies
in this regard are also substantial. We return to this
finding in the ‘‘Discussion and Conclusions’’. The
variables suggested by Hypotheses 1–3 contribute
tremendously to model fit. The improvement in
model fit from Model 1 in Table 4 to Model 5 in
Table 4 represents an increase in deviance of almost
430 points, which is statistically highly significant
(p\0.000001).
We conducted several additional analyses to
assess the robustness of the results in Table 4 and
Figures 2 and 3. First, we vary the estimation
method to a simple ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression.The results are presented in Table 5
(Models 1–4) where we find similar results to those
in Table 4. Second, we limit the sample to foreign
Figure 2 Effect plots for the moderating effect of policy
instability on the relationship between immigration and
resource commitment to a subsidiary abroad. The left panel
shows the effect of immigration on resource commitments to
subsidiaries abroad if the policy uncertainty there is low (mean
minus two standard deviations), and the right panel shows the
same relationship for high policy instability (mean plus two
standard deviations). The model underlying this plot is Model 5
in Table 4.
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subsidiaries located in non-EU countries. As the EU
is characterized by a common economic zone,
internationalization and the establishment of FDI
in foreign EU countries provides lower uncertainty
and risk for companies. Moreover, knowledge flows
quite easily and frequently between the member
countries. As conditions in non-EU countries are
different from the prevailing conditions in EU
countries, companies require more knowledge to
reduce their uncertainty. Table 5 reports results for
the same models as in Table 4, but for investments
in non-EU countries (Models 5–8). Again, the
results are statistically equivalent to the results in
Table 4. Third, we use an alternative host-country
instability measure. We use the political risk mea-
sure of the International Country Risk Guide from
the PRS Group. The last two models in Table 5
show results with this measurement and we find
similar results as in Table 4. This shows that also
political instability has a negative effect on the
immigration-commitment relationship.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper argues that immigrants provide compa-
nies with valuable knowledge about their home
countries. Firms may particularly benefit from this
knowledge when they have subsidiaries in those
countries. Because immigrants’ knowledge reduces
uncertainty regarding the host markets, firms can
more efficiently control investments in immi-
grants’ home countries. Consequently, firms will
commit more resources to those countries. More-
over, we argue that the effect of immigrants’
knowledge on a firm’s resource allocations abroad
is contingent on the environment both in the
immigrants’ and the firm’s home environments.
This is because an unstable environment in the
immigrants’ home countries will make the knowl-
edge advantage immigrants provide less valuable,
and because knowledge sharing between immi-
grants and local firms is reduced if anti-immigrant
sentiment is prominent in firms’ home
environments.
Our finding regarding the direct and positive
effect of immigration on resource commitment
mirrors existing findings in the literature. Javorcik
et al. (2011) and Foley and Kerr (2013) found that
immigration to the U.S. increases total assets of
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms in the migrants’
home country. Similarly, Kugler and Rapoport
(2007) conclude that immigration leads to higher
FDI outflows to immigrants’ home countries. We
add to those findings both conceptually and
Figure 3 Effect plots for the moderating effect of anti-
immigrant sentiment on the relationship between immigration
and resource commitment to a subsidiary abroad. The left panel
shows the effect of immigration on resource commitments to
subsidiaries abroad if the anti-immigrant sentiment is low (mean
minus two standard deviations), and the right panel shows the
same relationship for high anti-immigrant sentiment (mean plus
two standard deviations). The model underlying this plot is
Model 5 in Table 4.
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empirically. First, we integrate KBV-based reason-
ing (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Wiklund & Shepherd,
2003; Zander & Kogut, 1995) as a conceptual
backbone to the mechanism that connects immi-
gration and firms’ resource allocations. Second, we
provide a substantially more detailed analysis than
previous studies: we conceptualize and measure
migration on the district level (rather than the
country level) and capture FDI on the subsidiary
level (rather than the firm or country levels) across
all investment locations of a firm.
The reasoning for both moderating variables is
based on the logic of the flow of knowledge:
immigrants need to collect relevant knowledge in
their home countries and it must be made available
to firms in immigrants’ host countries. We connect
the KBV with the institution-based view from the
field of international business (Mudambi &
Navarra, 2002; Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & Chen,
2009) in the development of Hypothesis 2 and
Hypothesis 3. We extend recent research on the
relationship between migration effects and institu-
tions. For example, Shukla and Cantwell (2018)
discuss the importance of the institutional envi-
ronment for how immigration influences knowl-
edge flows between the home and the host country.
Also, Li, Hernandez, and Gwon (2019) introduce an
institutional lens into migration research and pro-
pose under which institutional conditions, positive
migration effects are most beneficial. In Hypothesis
2, we suggest that the value of immigrants’ host-
country knowledge to internationalizing firms is
limited in unstable host-country conditions. This is
because experientially acquired knowledge and
knowledge derived from networks become less
accurate when environments change. This finding
connects this paper with research on experiential
learning and specifically on knowledge recombina-
tion. To benefit from their knowledge when
expanding in a given country, firms need to adjust
their knowledge base to the conditions prevailing
in that country, through a process of knowledge
recombination (Hutzschenreuter, Voll, & Verbeke,
2011; Kogut & Zander, 1992). Such recombination
is arguably more complex if the policy environ-
ment in a target country is in flux. To some extent,
the support of Hypothesis 2 may also reflect that
non-FDI activities (such as exporting, licensing,
etc.) might be more appropriate options in such
environments. While central to many theories,
such as real options (Brouthers, Brouthers, &
Werner, 2008) or internationalization theory (Jo-
hanson & Vahlne, 1977), this contingency should
be the topic of future research.
We base Hypothesis 3 on the argument that firms
are able to absorb less knowledge from immigrants
under anti-immigrant sentiment. Our empirical
findings supporting this reasoning extend findings
from the area of knowledge flows within multina-
tional corporations, specifically the phenomenon
of absorptive capacity (e.g., Cohen & Levinthal,
1990; Minbaeva, Pedersen, Bjo¨rkman, Fey, & Park,
2003). We conceptualize anti-immigrant sentiment
as an institutional factor that reduces the ability to
absorb immigrant knowledge. Moreover, due to the
consideration of immigration flows to sub-national
entities (i.e., political districts), we add to the
debate of extending the national-state view to
smaller geographical clusters (Iammarino, 2018).
In summary, our findings highlight the relevance
of integrating home- and host-country-specific
institutional factors to understand the potential
for firms to derive benefits from immigrants’
knowledge (Cuervo-Cazurra, Luo, Ramamurti, &
Ang, 2018).
This paper uses a comprehensive dataset of firms’
resource allocations to its subsidiaries. We believe
the high level of granularity (subsidiary level) and
the extensive size of the dataset (more than 13,000
nonzero observations) allow us to unpack mecha-
nisms that several theoretical perspectives in pre-
vious literature suggest. This dataset allows a
detailed analysis that incorporates a broad set of
control variables on the subsidiary, firm, and
country levels. We believe the empirical setting is
well suited for an analysis of how migration
influences resource allocations, for several reasons.
First, the firm’s home country has one of the largest
immigrant populations relative to its overall pop-
ulation in the developed world. Second, immigra-
tion patterns in Austria are quite diverse as a
function of political districts and immigrants’
home countries. Third, Austria is an open economy
with a large share of international value-adding
activities in its GDP, and a strong integration into
global value chains. Furthermore, the economic
structure is heterogeneous, with small- and med-
ium-sized firms dominating the economy overall,
but to a lesser degree in urban than in rural areas.
Because Austria’s central bank collects the data,
firms are legally required to accurately report
figures at the subsidiary level. This indicates that
Benefitting from immigration Vera Kunczer et al.
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data quality is superior to commercially available
databases.
The empirical strategy this paper employs isolates
cases in which immigrants enter political districts
that are not strongly connected globally, following
the logic of global cities. The findings in support of
a general positive effect of immigration on resource
commitments in immigrants’ home countries by
local firms are robust across different estimation
techniques and samples. The degree to which
immigrants’ knowledge is representative of the
political environment in their home countries at
the time of an investment decision moderates
(Hypothesis 2) the positive main effect of immi-
gration on resource commitments (Hypothesis 1).
The readiness of the local community to absorb
immigrants’ knowledge is a significant contingency
of the main effect (Hypothesis 3). While our
measures for Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 only
capture parts of the country-specific knowledge
that migrants carry and transfer, our results indi-
cate that both variables fully eliminate the positive
effect of immigration on firms’ resource commit-
ment in the immigrants’ home country.
Our paper makes a number of important contri-
butions to International Business theory and busi-
ness practice. We believe this is the first paper to
connect migration with the KBV, both conceptu-
ally and empirically on a subsidiary level. Based on
our assessment, the KBV logic is important to
understand the relevance of migration for interna-
tionally active firms (or firms that intend to inter-
nationalize). This paper, hence, makes an
important contribution to International Business
theory by integrating the KBV with existing insti-
tutional perspectives on uncertainty and risk in the
context of firm internationalization. It highlights
how dimensions of home- and host-country policy
influence the extent to which immigrants’ knowl-
edge is relevant to firm internationalization. We
demonstrate that research needs to consider an
institutional perspective on both ends of migra-
tion: where people come from and where they go,
and that migration is (similar to distance) a two-
end-point construct. Although recent literature has
highlighted the importance of the institutional
environment for immigrants’ knowledge flows (Li
et al., 2019; Shukla & Cantwell, 2018), we believe
this paper is among the first to connect the two
end-points in a coherent conceptual model on a
high level of granularity and based on a consistent
theoretical angle.
This paper also leads to numerous policy impli-
cations. In Hypothesis 1, we propose that immi-
grants transfer valuable knowledge about their
home country to local firms, which increases firms’
resource commitment in these countries. This leads
to the following three policy implications: First,
most developed countries currently base migration
policies on education or industry-specific compe-
tencies. However, our results point to the relevance
of migrants’ country knowledge as a relevant source
of knowledge in the process of firm international-
ization. The origin of immigration flows could
therefore be a factor in national investment strate-
gies, and migration management systems could be
managed accordingly. To benefit from this knowl-
edge, countries might consider aligning immigra-
tion policy with firms’ internationalization
patterns. In this sense, it is important for policy-
makers to have an understanding of the relevance
of foreign markets for local firms, either in terms of
providers of inputs, or in terms of target markets for
outputs. Second, to benefit from migrant knowl-
edge, immigration barriers should be lowered for
immigrants from countries that are central to the
international operations of firms in a specific home
country. Especially, countries characterized by high
risk and a low level of FDI often provide major
opportunities for companies. Nevertheless, the
level of knowledge about those countries is often
very limited in developed markets. Therefore, pol-
icymakers could provide lower immigration restric-
tions specifically for people from such countries in
order to increase the knowledge pool in the firms’
home country with regard to those countries.
Third, immigration from those countries can also
be actively fostered. This may increase the size of
knowledge pools from which local firms can
benefit.
The connection of KBV with an institutional
perspective introduces an additional policy dimen-
sion to the paper. It highlights how home- and
host-country policies can influence the extent to
which immigrants’ knowledge is relevant to firm
internationalization. In Hypothesis 2, we argue that
policy uncertainty in the target country reduces the
positive effect of immigration on resource alloca-
tions to immigrants’ home countries. Although we
look only at one specific dimension of the
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environment (i.e., policy), the effect is strong
enough to eliminate the positive effect of immi-
gration on resource commitment. High migration
inflows from unstable countries are necessary to
maintain information advantages derived from
immigration. Constant immigration assures that
companies can access relevant and up-to-date
information. Policymakers could therefore promote
steady immigration from those countries in order
to guarantee a continuous knowledge inflow.
In Hypothesis 3, we argue that, under circum-
stances of high anti-immigrant sentiment, firms
can benefit less from immigration. This result
suggests that low acceptance of immigrants ham-
pers the transfer of knowledge from the immigrants
to the local community and hence the companies.
This leads to policy implications on two levels.
First, policymakers can inform and educate the
local communities about the potential benefits of
immigration for the local economy. They can
highlight, for example, that immigration from
countries that are relevant for local firms’ interna-
tionalization leads to more international economic
activity. This, in turn, increases economic output
and employment. Second, policymakers can sup-
port the integration of immigrants into the local
community and their new environment. This may
reduce negative sentiment towards immigrants.
Policymakers may, for example, consider setting
up a knowledge exchange between immigrants and
firms in order to overcome barriers to knowledge
absorption present in locations with strong anti-
immigrant sentiment. The result of Hypothesis 3 is
also relevant for policymakers because firms might
base location decisions on this information. Firms
with significant international economic activity or
firms that have the strong strategic intention to
improve their international markets presence have
a knowledge incentive to locate in regions with
comparatively low anti-immigrant sentiment. As
districts compete to some extent for firm invest-
ments to create employment, demand, and infras-
tructure, this may provide a competitive
disadvantage for districts with high anti-immigrant
sentiment.
This paper also has some limitations, which may
provide avenues for future research. First, it looks
only at immigration, instead of a combination of
immigration and emigration, which may provide
even deeper insights into how migrants influence
the global economy at a firm level. Future studies
could investigate the different effects emigration
can have on the knowledge available in the com-
panies’ home country versus the knowledge effects
this has in the host country. Second, this study is
empirically limited to Austria, which has some
characteristics that limit generalizability. It is
located in the developed world, which may influ-
ence how the knowledge that immigrants carry
influences internationalization. Austria is also a
relatively small country with an economy domi-
nated by small- and medium-sized enterprises, and
its immigration and labor policies are rather strict.
Studies that do not limit the companies’ home
country to only one country would therefore
provide additional insights into this issue. Further-
more, investigating this topic in the context of the
developing world (e.g., South–South migration, or
North–South migration) would contribute to theo-
retical development. Third, this paper looks at
resource allocations to foreign subsidiaries, not at
subsidiary performance or other strategic variables
such as entry mode. We therefore encourage future
studies to look at how immigrants’ knowledge
influences the success of foreign operations which
would, besides an important theoretical advance-
ment, also lead to central practical implications.
Finally, this paper uses an empirical methodology
that allows comparisons between many firms.
However, a qualitative methodology may produce
more insight into the mechanisms that govern the
positive effect of immigration on resource commit-
ment that this paper outlines in broad terms.
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NOTES
1Registration of residence is compulsory in Austria,
and tied to the receipt of social benefits and work
permits.
2BZO¨ (Alliance for the Future of Austria) and FPO¨
(Freedom Party of Austria) are Austrian right-wing
parties supporting immigration restrictions to
Austria.
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3Because geographic distance is a symmetric
concept based on a two-dimensional surface, it is
not exposed to the ‘‘one-country problem’’ in
distance studies.
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